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NLRB DISCOVERY AFTER ROBBINS:
MORE PERIL FOR PRIVATE LITIGANTS
Despite criticism by courts and commentators,' the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (Board) has traditionally restricted prehearing discovery in unfair
labor practice proceedings in order to forestall intimidation of potential %it-
nesses and to promote administrative efficiency. 2 The Supreme Court recently
bolstered the Board's position by holding in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co. 3 that prehearing witness statements are exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)4 at least until the completion of the
Board's unfair labor practice proceedings.5 Robbins' conclusive presumption
that witness intimidation will result from prehearing disclosure of any witness
affidavit would appear to end litigants' use of the FOIA as a discovery device in
Board proceedings. 6
The salient issue after Robbins is whether the Supreme Court's refusal to
consider the factual exigencies surrounding employer requests for witness
statements will further restrict the use of other methods to obtain relevant
information prior to Board hearings. This Note argues that, on the con-
trary, courts should scrutinize more closely Board rules that often deny litigants
access to such information regardless of the factual circumstances of each case.
In contrast to the mechanical approach used by the Court in Robbins, courts
should weigh the Board's interest in protecting its witnesses from coercion and
retaliation against the needs of private litigants to prepare their defenses. This
approach would produce demonstrably fairer results than would extension of
the Robbins rationale to obstruct avenues of discovery other than the FOIA.
Part I of this Note discusses the Board's restrictive discovery rules and
Robbins' rejection of the FOIA as an alternative prehearing device to gather
information. Part II analyzes the current split in the circuits regarding the
applicability of discovery rules in Board proceedings and advocates an ap-
1. See NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 1977); New England
Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1976); Capital Cities Communica-
tions, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Irving, The Right to Privacy and
Freedom of Information: The NLRB and Issues Under the Privacy Act and the Freedom of
Information Act, in Proceedings of New York University Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on
Labor 49 (R. Adelman ed. 1976); Jenkins, Proposals for Changes in XLRB Procedures, 45
L.R.R.M. 94, 101 (1959); Rothman, Proposals on NLRB Procedures, 45 L.R.R.M. 86, 92 (1959);
Preheating Discovery in NLRB Proceedings, [1975] Lab. Rel. Y.B. 334, 334-36 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Preheating Discovery].
2. See notes 7-21 infra and accompanying text.
3. 98 S. Ct. 2311 (1978).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
5. 98 S. Ct. at 2327.
6. See Boatel Alaska, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 196(July 13, 1978), [197815 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
(NLRB Dec.) 19,519 (denied FOIA request citing Supreme Court's Robbins decision). Recent
cases prior to Robbins denying FOIA requests include: Xidex Corp. v. NLRB, 83 Lab. Cas. 18,234
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Local 836, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 83 Lab. Cas. 18,233
(E.D. Wis. 1978); Nebraska Bulk Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 83 Lab. Cas. 17,788 (D. Neb. 1978);
Ronald Hackenberger, 236 N.L.R.B. No. 117 (June 20, 1978), [19781 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
(NLRB Dec.) 19,460; Jobbers' Supply Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 15 (May 16, 1978), [197815 Lab.
L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,328; Am-Del-Co., inc., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 156 (Feb. 22, 1978),
[1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,007.
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proach that more equitably balances the rights of the Board and of charged
parties. Part Ill examines the courts' use of a balancing approach to determine
the lawfulness of attempts to circumvent restrictive discovery rules by inter-
viewing employees to obtain information or by requesting prehearing state-
ments directly from potential witnesses rather than from the Board.
I. Robbins AND THE FOIA DIscOvERY DEVICE
A. The Scope of Board Discovery Rules
Litigants' attempts to use the FOIA as a discovery device were primarily a
response to the narrow scope of the Board's discovery rules. 7 These rules are
premised on the assumption that revealing the identity of witnesses and the
content of their statements prior to the hearing will invariably result in eco-
nomic and physical coercion. 8 The Board contends that individuals, usually
employees, would be unwilling to give candid testimony to the Board if they
knew that their statements could be divulged to employers prior to the hear-
ing.9 In addition, such disclosure would delay adjudicative proceedings and
consequently interfere with the Board's dual role as prosecutor and adjudicator
of unfair labor practice disputes.10 Accordingly, the Board grants the right to
7. See Connolly & Fox, Employer Rights and Access to Documents Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 46 Fordharn L. Rev. 203, 230-35 (1977); Note, Backdooring the NLRB: Use and
Abuse of the Amended FOIA for Administrative Discovery, 8 Loy. Chi. L.J. 145, 165-67 (1976).
8. Garvey, Prehearing Discovery in NLRB Proceedings, 26 Lab. L.J. 710, 712 (1975); Manoll
& Joseph, The National Labor Relations Board and Discovery Procedures, 18 Ad. L. Rev. 9, 15
(Winter-Spring 1966).
9. "Statements made during an investigation by employees to Board agents may and often do
reveal an employee's and his co-workers' attitudes and activities in relation to a union and their
employer. If an employee knows that statements made by him will be revealed to an employer, he Is
less likely, for fear of reprisal, to make an uninhibited and non-evasive statement, a circumstance
complicating a determination of the actual facts in a labor dispute." NLRB v. National Survey
Serv., Inc., 361 F.2d 199, 206 (7th Cir. 1966); accord, NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415
F.2d 26, 34 (5th Cir. 1969);see, e.g., Modulus Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 15, 1978), (1978
5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,387; Wayne Trophy Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (May
24, 1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) $ 19,388. See also Wellman Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Sure-Tan Inc., 234
N.L.R.B. No. 190 (Mar. 6, 1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,105; Howard
P. Foley Co., 229N.L.R.B. 1167, 1169(1977); General Servs., Ing., 229 N.L.R.B. 940, 941(1977).
The Board has thus refused to apply the more liberal pretrial discovery procedures of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Air Lacarte, Fla., Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 764, 765 (1974); Lyman
Printing & Finishing Co., 183 N.L.R.B. 1048 (1970), enforced per curiam, 437 F.2d 1356 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); Krieger-Ragsdale & Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 490, 495 (1966),
enforced, 379 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041 (1967); Sealtest S. Dairies, 126
N.L.R.B. 1223 (1960), enforced, 287 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1961).
10. The prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are served by the General Counsel and the
Board, respectively. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976); Preheating Discovery, supra note 1 at 337. The
Board has authority under the Administrative Procedure Act to promulgate its own procedural
rules to govern the conduct of hearings. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-556 (1976). Although there Is no
constitutional or statutory requirement to provide discovery in agency proceedings, Frilette v.
Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 980 (1975), the administrative
hearing must still comply with the fundamentals of due process. See Silverman v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir. 1977); Swift & Co. v. United States, 308 F.2d
849, 851 (7th Cir. 1962).
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take depositions only to obtain evidence from witnesses who will be unavail-
able at trial, 1 1 and prohibits its employees from producing any investigative files
or records pursuant to subpoenas. 1 2
Critics have argued that the Board's denial of pretrial discovery promotes
"trial by ambush.' 3 Respondents claim they are afforded little opportunity
before the hearing to determine the nature of the Board's case or to prepare an
adequate defense.14 Parties typically complain that they are frequently una-
ware of the witnesses who will be called to testify. Often they do not know the
specific facts of the alleged discriminatory or coercive incident which forms the
basis of the charge against them. Is The parties contend that the Board should
be able to prevail in its hearings on the strength of its own case and not because
of the "Board-fostered" difficulties in preparing a defense. 16
The Board, however, asserts that the lack of pretrial discovery does not
result in unfairness to charged parties.17 If an unfair labor practice charge is not
11. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1977). This rule states in pertinent part: "Witnesses shall be examined
orally under oath, except that for good cause shown after the issuance of a complaint, testimony
may be taken by deposition.... The regional director or administrative law judge, as the case may
be, shall upon receipt of the application, if in his discretion good cause has been shown, make and
serve upon the parties an order which will specify the name of the witness whose deposition is to be
taken ... ." The Board has interpreted the "good cause" requirement to permit depositions only
"where the witness will not be available to testify at the hearing." NLRB Casehandling Manual
§ 10352.3 (1975), reprinted in NLRB Casehandling Manual (CCH) 3523 (1976). See also United
Terrazzo Precast Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 612, 612 (1975); Locke Insulators, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 653,
654 (1975).
12. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (1977); see NLRB v. Duquesne Elec. & Mfg. Co., 518 F.2d 701, 705
(3d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg. Inc., 458 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1972).
13. See New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 383 (1st Cir. 1976);
Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1976). One
court, although it felt bound by the Board's general discovery policy to uphold denial of an FOIA
request, also took the opportunity to criticize that policy: "We join in plaintiff's condemnation of
NLRB discovery practices. We are, indeed, shocked that such discovery is so stringently limited.
Counsel for parties charged with unfair labor practices must, of necessity, engage in considerable
guesswork. The N.L.R.B. has in this proceeding, and apparently all across the country, fought the
F.O.I.A. and balked at courts' attempts to enforce it. We note that other courts which have [denied
FOIA disclosure] have also been reluctant to do so.... The F.O.I.A. does not provide this court
with a vehicle for reforming archaic N.L.R.B. proceedings, despite the Court's contrary desires."
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.RR.M. 3527, 3531 (D. Kan. 1976).
14. See Garvey, supra note 8, at 718; Prehearing Discovery, supra note 1, at 340-41.
15. See NLRB v. Scenic Sportswear, 475 F.2d 1226, 1227 (6th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 601 (5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Duncan Foundry & Mach. Works,
435 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1970); Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Center, 236 N.L.R.B. No. 41
(May 25, 1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,389; Chateau De Vile, Inc., 233
N.L.R.B. No. 161 (Dec. 13, 1977), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,044; Pet Inc.
Dairy Group, 229 N.L.R.B. 1241 (1977). See also NLRB Casehandling Manual §§ 10262-10266
(1975), reprinted in NLRB Casehandling Manual (CCH) 2620 (1976).
16. Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2804, 2810 (W.D. Okla.), rev'd, 93 L.LR.M.
2799 (10th Cir. 1976).
17. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dutch Boy, Inc., [1978] 4 Lab. L. Rep. (CC) (Lab. Cas.) 10,635
(W.D. Okla. Apr. 24, 1978) (no denial of due process when a subpoena duces tecum issued by the
Board to acquire employer's documents is enforced even though the Board refuses to produce its
documents prior to hearing); Midwest Paper Prods. Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 1367 (1976) (Board's refusal
to release affidavits prior to the hearing is not a denial of due process); United Terrazzo Precast Co.,
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sufficiently clear, parties can request a bill of particulars to inform them of the
specific facts underlying allegations.' 8 Furthermore, the Board holds pretrial
conferences for simplification of issues and for purposes of settlement,"9 and
delivers copies of witnesses' prehearing statements to opposing counsel after the
witnesses have testified to ensure proper cross-examination. 20 According to the
Board, these procedures are adequate to protect the interests of all parties. 2 1
In response, many disgruntled litigants turned to the FOIA to obtain wit-
ness statements, affidavits, and similar records compiled by the Board which it
would otherwise refuse to disclose. 22 The courts recognized the lack of
discovery procedures provided by the Board, and acknowledged that "if
pre-hearing discovery is to be obtained as a matter of right by a party charged
with an unfair labor practice, the source for the right must be found
within the Freedom of Information Act."23
221 N.L.R.B. 612 (1975) (denial of motion for discovery not prejudicial). See also Air Lacarte, Fli.,
Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 764, 765 (1975); Lyman Printing & Finishing Co., 183 N.L.R.B. 1048 (1970),
enforced per curiam, 437 F.2d 1356 (4th Cir. 1971).
18. NLRB Casehandling Manual §§ 10292.1-.4 (1975), reprinted in NLRB Casehandling
Manual (CCEI) 2920-24 (1976).
19. Id. § 10350, reprinted in NLRB Casehandhng Manual (CCH) 3500 (1976).
20. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b)(1) (1977). The Board patterned this rule after the holding In Jencks
v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). In that case, the Court held that a union official charged In a
criminal proceeding with filing false affidavits was entitled to compel production of FBI informers'
reports after direct examination of the informers for the purpose of impeaching their testimony. Tie
Board contends that this rule is fair and practical because it minimizes the potential for witness
intimidation by keeping the witness' name and testimony confidential until after he testifies, insures
a voluntary supply of information to the Board, and affords adequate opportunity to respondents
for rebuttal of the government's arguments. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M.
3527 (D. Kan. 1976); Gerico, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2713 (D. Colo, 1976); Vegas Village
Shopping Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2683 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Hook Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 91
L.R.R.M. 2797 (S.D. Ind. 1976).
21. Prehearing Discovery, supra note 1, at 338-39; see Ronald Hackenberger, 236 N.L.R.B.
No. 117 (June 20, 1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,460; Mid-West Paper
Prods. Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 1367, 1367 n.1 (1976).
22. See generally A. Levenson & H. Pitt, Government Information 43-51 (1978); J. O'Reilly,
Federal Information Disclosure 17-20 to -24 (1977). The statute imposes upon federal agencies
obligations to disclose certain information, and establishes the procedure and criteria for determin-
ing the availability of requested material. 5 U.S.C. § 532(a) (1976); see Guidelinesfor Freedom of
Information Requests, NLRB Casehandling Manual (CCH) 1 30,001 (1976). Various types of
information have been requested from the Board pursuant to the FOIA. See Committee on
Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977) (authorization cards); Deering Milliken,
Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1977) (tax recoids, payroll records, statements, and notes
relating to interim earnings of backpay claimants); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (lists of names and addresses of employees).
23. Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834
(1976). See also Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971, 977 (N.D. Cal.
1976). Most courts passing on Board denials of FOIA requests found the discovery rights of
respondents relevant to their determinations. See, e.g., Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563
F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2311 (1978); Goodfriend W. Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d
145, 147 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976). But see Cessna Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 405 F.
Supp. 1042, 1046 (D. Kan. 1975), rev'd, 542 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1976) ("The Board cannot seriously
contend that it is somehow exempt from provisions of the [FOIA], or that its internal rules and
regulations regarding discovery may apply to nullify provisions of that Act.")
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B. The Impact of Robbins on the FOIA as a Discovery Alternative
The FOIA was not originally intended as a discovery device, but was
designed to assure public access to all federal records whose disclosure would
not significantly harm specific governmental interests. 24 The statutory pre-
sumption is in favor of disclosure, but the agency that has custody of the record
may rebut this presumption with evidence that the particular item requested
falls within one of nine specific exemptions. 2s The Board, relying on exemption
7(A), has repeatedly denied requests for witness statements. 2 6 That exemption
provides that disclosure is not required of "investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that production of such
records would . . . interfere with enforcement proceedings.12 7 The Board
argues that release of prehearing statements compiled during its investigations
of unfair labor practice charges would deter witnesses from testifying, and
would thus interfere with its proceedings. 2 8
24. Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974); EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 80 (1973). "Congress passed the [FOIA] in response to a persistent problem of legislators
and citizens, the problem of obtaining adequate information to evaluate federal programs and
formulate wise policies. Congress recognized that the public cannot make intelligent decisions
without such information, and that governmental institutions become unresponsive to public needs
if knowledge of their activities is denied to the people and their representatives. The touchstone of
any proceedings under the Act must be the clear legislative intent to assure public access to all
governmental records whose disclosure would not significantly harm specific governmental in-
terests. The policy of the Act requires that the disclosure requirement be construed broadly, the
exemptions narrowly." Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally H.R.
Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1966), reprinted in Subcomm. on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom of Information Act
Source Book 22-27 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Source Book).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976). These exemptions were "not intended by Congress to be
used either to prohibit disclosure of information or to justify automatic withholding of information.
Rather, they merely mark the outer limits of information that may be withheld where the agency
makes an affirmative determination that the public interest and the specific circumstances pre-
sented dictate that the information should be withheld. Agencies have been slow to adopt this
-attitude, but enlightened judicial decisions reflect this approach to interpreting the force of the
FOIA exemptions." 1974 Source Book, supra note 24, at 2.
26. See, e.g., Boatel Alaska, Inc., 236 N.L.RtB. No. 196 (July 13, 1978), [19781 5 Lab. L. Rep.
(CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,519; Jobbers' Supply Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 15 (May 16, 1978), [197815
Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,328; Am-Del-Co., Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. No. 156 (Feb. 22,
1978), [19781 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) T 19,007.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976). A document is an "investigatory record" if it was created as
part of an agency inquiry into conduct which may have violated a statute or regulation adminis-
tered by that agency. J. O'Reilly, supra note 22, at 17-17.
The investigatory records exemption in its entirety applies whenever "production of such records
would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national
security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential
source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical
safety of law enforcement personnel." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976).
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121, 124 (1972); Trustees of Boston Univ v.
NLRB, 575 F.2d 301, 309-11 (1st Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U-S July
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Most courts agreed with the Board that it need not accede to requests for
statements that would enable employers to intimidate witnesses or allow them
to learn the Board's case in advance. 29 Undaunted, charged parties continued
to make FOIA requests for prehearing information. 30 The Supreme Court
11, 1978) (No. 78-67); NLRB v. Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc., 523 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1975);
Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974);
NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26, 34 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. National Survey
Serv., Inc., 361 F.2d 199, 206 (7th Cir. 1966).
29. See Abrahamson Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1977); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548
F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1977); New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (Ist Cir.
1976); Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1976); Maremont Corp. v.
NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2799 (10th Cir. 1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 63 (10th
Cir. 1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976); Goodfriend W. Corp. v.
Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); Title Guarantee Co.
v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Howard Johnson Co. v.
NLRB, 96 L.R.R.M. 2215 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 95 L.R.R.M. 2638
(E.D. La. 1977); L'Eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2488 (C.D. Cal. 1976); ITT Am.
Elec. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2815 (N.D. Miss. 1976); Gerico, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2713
(D. Colo. 1976); Vegas Village Shopping Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2683 (C.D. Cal. 1976);
Harowe Servo Controls, Inc. v. NLRB, 92.L.R.R.M. 2572 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Pacific Photo Type,
Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2560 (D. Hawaii 1976); Electri-Flex v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2142
(N.D. Ill. 1976); Read's Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2722 (D. Md. 1976); Atlas Indus. v. NLRB,
91 L.R.R.M. 2676 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Jamco Int'l v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2446 (N.D. Okla. 1976);
Chassen Bakers, Inc. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2345 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Kaminer v. NLRB, 90
L.R.R.M. 2269 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
District courts granting access to information under the FOIA include: Thermo King Corp. v.
NLRB, 83 Lab. Cas. 18,415 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Tri-State Culvert Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 Lab. Cas.
18,345 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 83 Lab. Cas. 17,992 (N.D. Tex.
1978); Delchamps, Inc. v. NLRB, 83 Lab. Cas. 17,789 (S.D. Ala. 1978); Dutch Boy Inc.,
Glow-Lite Div. v. NLRB, 83 Lab. Cas. 17,748 (N.D. Tex. 1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2072 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Barnes & Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M.
2169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
30. The Supreme Court's language in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975),
may have spurred much of this litigation. The Court intimated that the FOIA is coextensive with
agency discovery procedures in certain circumstances. It found that Congress intended exemption 5
of the FOIA, relating to "intra-agency memoranda," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976), "to permit
disclosure of those intra-agency memoranda which would 'routinely be disclosed' in private
litigation... and we accept this as the law." 421 U.S. at 149 n. 16 (citations omitted). This language
was construed to support the argument that the FOIA was intended as a discovery device. See
Connolly & Fox, supra note 7, at 233-34. The Court in Sears, however, held only that access to
documents under exemption 5 could not exceed that permitted under normal agency discovery
procedures. 421 U.S. at 148-49. It did not find that an agency must yield to an FOIA request where
the agency's discovery rules would permit disclosure. The Court stated: "The ability of a private
litigant to override a privilege claim set up by the Government, with respect to an otherwise
disclosable document, may itself turn on the extent of the litigant's need in the context of the facts of
his particular case .... However, it is not sensible to construe the Act to require disclosure of any
document which would be disclosed in the hypothetical litigation in which the private party's claim
is the most compelling." Id. at 149 n. 16 (citations omittedi. Moreover, the tendency of the courts to
equate FOIA disclosure in Board proceedings, with the rights to discovery permitted by the Board,
has been criticized as ignoring the separate purposes of the FOIA and discovery procedures. The
policy behind the FOIA is public disclosure without a demonstration of need, whereas the goal of
discovery is the elimination of surprise and unfair trial practices. Project, Government information
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responded to the ensuing flood of litigation in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber
Co.31
In Robbins, after a contested representation election, the Board issued an
unfair labor practice complaint against the employer alleging interference with
the protected rights of its employees. 32 Pursuant to the FOIA, the employer
requested copies of all potential witness statements compiled by the Board
during its investigation. 33 When the Board refused to comply with these
requests, the employer sued to compel disclosure of the statements. 34 The dis-
trict court directed the Board to provide the statements for copying because
the Board had not "demonstrated how the delivery to plaintiff several days
prior to the scheduled hearing ... will interfere with enforcement proceedings
.... "35 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and found that the Board had failed to
sustain its burden of demonstrating the applicability of exemption 7(A) because
it had introduced no evidence that witness intimidation was likely to occur in
the brief period between disclosure and the hearing. 36 The Supreme Court
reversed, and held that "witness statements in pending unfair labor practice
proceedings are exempt from FOIA disclosure [under exemption 7(A)] at least
until the completion of the Board's hearing." 37
The Court first looked to the statutory language of the FOIA to uphold the
Board's policy of denying disclosure of witness statements prior to the comple-
tion of its hearings. In a cursory analysis, the Court found that the specific
provisions of the statute do not require case-by-case scrutiny of an agency's
and the Rights of Citizens, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 971, 1150 (1975). See also Note, Discovery of
Government Documents and the Official Information Privilege, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 142, 143-44,
152-55 (1976).
31. 98 S. Ct. 2311 (1978).
32. The employer was charged with violating § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976), by interfering with employees' protected rights during a
representation campaign after which the union failed to win a majority of the ballots cast in the
election. 98 S. Ct. at 2314.
33. These requests are generally made contemporaneously with or after applications to the
administrative law judge for depositions, interrogatories, or notices to produce affidavits. See, e.g.,
New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 383 (1st Cir. 1976) (requests for
supervisors' and nonemployees' statements); Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d
1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1976) (requests for employees' statements); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB,
538 F.2d 80, 81 (3d Cir. 1976) (requests for statements of charging parties and potential witnesses).
34. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2586, 2587 (N.D. Ala. 1976). Federal
district courts have "jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order
the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
35. 92 L.R.R.M. at 2589.
36. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1977). The Fifth Circuit
suggested several criteria to determine whether disclosure of witness statements prior to the hearing
would "interfere" with enforcement proceedings. The factors included: "whether the history of
labor relations in the community and at the plant makes intimidation of these witnesses reasonably
foreseeable; whether the witnesses work in jobs ... or have records of job performance that make
intimidation of them a likely result of disclosure; the nature of the testimony which the unknown
affiants are expected to give." Id. at 732. The court observed that in camera inspection may be
helpful in that determination. Id. at 732 n.27.
37. 98 S. Ct. at 2324.
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claimed exemption. 38 The employer had argued that because the statute places
the burden of justifying nondisclosure on -the agency, expressly permits in
camera review of document, 39 and mandates the release of reasonably segre-
gable non-exempt material, 40 the FOIA "necessarily contemplates that the
Board must specifically demonstrate in each case that disclosure would inter-
fere with a pending enforcement proceeding. ' ' 4' The Court disagreed. It found
that the provision for in camera review does not mandate individual exam-
inations, since it is discretionary and "is designed to be invoked when the issue
before the District Court could not be otherwise resolved. '4 2 Similarly, the
Court argued that the provision directing release of segregable portions of
records does not address "the prior question of what material is exempt.
'43
Finally, although Congress placed the burden on the agency to justify applica-
tion of an exemption, the statute does not indicate what kind of burden the
agency must satisfy. 44 The Court thus refused to rely on these provisions alone
to determine the propriety of the employer's demand for disclosure.
45
The Court next examined the legislative history of exemption 7(A) to ascer-
tain the type of interference required to justify nondisclosure of witness
affidavits. The original exemption 7 applied to "investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a private
party."'46 The Court found that Congress enacted this exemption to prevent
harm to the government's case which would result from allowing litigants
"earlier or greater access" to agency investigatory files than they would oth-
erwise have had under the agency's own discovery rules. 4 7 Such premature
disclosure would interfere with Board enforcement proceedings by enabling
litigants to "construct defenses which would permit violations to go unrem-
edied."'4s Furthermore, disclosure would inevitably deter witnesses from
38. Id. at 2317.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976) provides that upon complaint, the district court "shall
determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to
determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions
set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action."
40. Id. § 552(b) provides: "Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to
any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this
subsection."
41. 98 S. Ct. at 2317-18.
42. Id. at 2318; see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-94 (1973); Mervin v. FTC, No. 77-1204,
slip op. at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 2, 1978) (per curiam); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
43. 98 S. Ct. at 2318.
44. Id.
45. Id. The Court also compared the literal language of subdivision 7(A) with the other
subdivisions of exemption 7. These latter provisions "refer to particular cases-'a person,' 'an
unwarranted invasion,' 'a confidential source'--and thus seem to require a showing that the factors
made relevant by the statute are present in each distinct situation. By contrast, since subdivision
(A) speaks in the plural voice about 'enforcement proceedings,' it appears to contemplate that
certain generic determinations might be made." Id. at 2317.
46. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 234, § 3(e)(7), 80 Stat. 251 (1966) (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976)).
47. 98S. Ct. at2318;see H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2dSess. 11 (1966), reprinted in 1974
Source Book, supra note 24, at 32.
48. 98 S. Ct. at 2326 (quoting New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377,
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making "uninhibited and non-evasive statement[s]" during the course of the
investigation and hearing of unfair labor practice cases.49
The Court also declared that the 1974 amendment of exemption 7 did not
reflect a change in the original congressional intent. The purpose of the
amendment was to rectify erroneous judicial decisions that had held all mate-
rial in investigatory files to be automatically nondisclosable even though disclo-
sure would not interfere with pending enforcement proceedings. 50 The
amendment changed the language of the exemption to deny disclosure of
investigatory materials if it would "interfere with enforcement proceedings." 5'
The Court concluded that Congress had thereby intended not to change the
original purpose of the exemption, but to construe it more narrowly by looking
to the specific reasons for denying disclosure.5 2 Nevertheless, the Court found
that Congress had intended that the Board's burden is to prove only that the
"disclosure of particular kinds of investigatory records while a case is pending
would generally 'interfere with enforcement proceedings.' ",53
Lastly, the Court focused on the peculiar nature of unfair labor practice
proceedings to conclude that disclosure of witness statements prior to comple-
tion of Board hearings would "necessarily" interfere with those proceedings.S4
Since denials of FOIA requests are immediately reviewable in the district
382 (1st Cir. 1976)); see Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301, 311 (1st Cir. 1978),
petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. July 11, 1978) (No. 78-67); Title Guarantee Co. v.
NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
49. 98 S. Ct. at 2319 (quoting NLRB v. National Survey Serv., Inc., 361 F.2d 199, 206 (7th
Cir. 1966)); see 1974 Source Book, supra note 24, at 110-11.
50. 98 S. Ct. at 2319-23. The District of Columbia Circuit had "erected a 'stone wall' against
public access to any material"; it refused to permit disclosure if the requested information was part
of an investigatory file, without considering whether disclosure would interfere with enforcement
proceedings, or whether any proceedings were pending. Id. at 2320 (citing Center for Natl Policy
Review on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Ditlow v.
Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); Aspin v. Department of
Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.Zd 1195
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974)); see 120 Cong. Rec. 17033 (1974) (remarks of
Sen. Hart).
51. Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b), 88 Stat.
1561 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970)).
52. 98 S. Ct. at 2322-23.
53. Id. at 2323-24. The Court noted that President Ford had vetoed the amendment of
exemption 7(A) because he viewed it as requiring agencies to "prove . . . -separately for each
paragraph of each document-that disclosure 'would' cause a specific harm." Id. at 2323 (quoting
Freedom of Information Act-Veto Message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc.
No. 93-383, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974), reprinted in Comm. on Government Operations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 Source Book 398-99
(Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Source Book]). In the debate leading to Congress'
override of the veto, supporters of the amendment suggested that the President's remarks were
"ludicrous" and that "the burden is substantially less than we would be led to believe by the
President's message." 1975 Source Book at 406 (remarks of Rep. Moorhead), 450 (remarks of Sen.
Hart).
54. 98 S. Ct. at 2327. "The danger of witness intimidation is particularly acute with respect to
current employees-whether rank and file, supervisory, or managerial-over whom the employer,
by virtue of the employment relationship, may exercise intense leverage ...
".... The possibility that a FOIA-induced change in the Board's preheating discovery rules will
have a chilling effect on the Board's sources cannot be ignored." Id. at 2326.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
courts, Board personnel would be constantly involved in FOIA discovery
contests. Disclosure would therefore potentially delay adjudicatory proceed-
ings. 5 - More importantly, disclosure of witness statements would invite em-
ployers or unions to coerce or intimidate employees and others who have given
statements, "in an effort to make them change their testimony or not testify at
all."'5 6 Finally, although the Court noted that the Board's general discovery
procedures have been criticized, it refused to interpret a statute designed for a
different purpose to compel the type of disclosure particularly abhorrent to the
Board's traditional policy.5 7 Thus, the Court concluded that disclosure of
witness statements under the FOIA could be no more extensive than the degree
of discovery actually permitted by the Board's regulations.5 8
Justices Powell and Brennan disagreed with the majority's reliance on the
Board's discovery rules to define the scope of FOIA disclosure. s9 They first
observed that Congress' overall purpose in enacting the FOIA was to discour-
age agencies from withholding information from the public by promulgating
restrictive rules of discovery under their "housekeeping" rulemaking author-
ity. 60 By abandoning the language of the original exemption 7, Congress
intended the courts to make "a more focused inquiry into the likelihood of
harm resulting from disclosure of investigatory records."'6 1 Thus, the mere
determination that FOIA disclosure would expand the normal discovery
permitted by an agency is insufficient to support a finding that disclosure
would disrupt an enforcement proceeding.62 The Board therefore should have
55. Id. at 2324-25.
56. Id. at 2325. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976)
adequately deters employers from harassing employees who provide statements to the Board.
Section 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against any
employee who has testified to the Board. The Court declared that "the possibility of deterrence
arising from post hoc disciplinary action is no substitute for a prophylactic rule that prevents the
harm to a pending enforcement proceeding which flows from a witness having been intimidated."
98 S. Ct. at 2325.
57. 98 S. Ct. at 2324, 2326. Despite this reluctance, the Court did acknowledge that "those
drafting discovery rules for the Board might determine that this 'interference' is one that should
be tolerated in order to promote a fairer decisionmaking process . . . ." Id. at 2326.
In a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens
agreed that "[a] statute that authorized discovery greater than that available under the rules
normally applicable to an enforcement proceeding would 'interfere' with the proceeding" in the
sense of the word "meddling." Id. at 2327 (Stevens, J , concurring).
58. Id. at 2326-27.
59. Id. at 2328 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 2328 n.i (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Board's
rulemaking authority is granted under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
61. 98 S. Ct. at 2328 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. The dissent observed that the Fifth Circuit in Robbins had also criticized courts' use of a
discovery standard to determine the scope of FOIA disclosure. The Fifth Circuit stated that "[i]f the
mere fact that one could not have obtained the document in private discovery were enough, the
Board would have made naught of the requirement that nondisclosure be permitted 'only to the
extent that ... production. . . would ... interfere' in some way." Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v.
NLRB, 563 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir. 1977). The dissent also noted that the Board's denial of
discovery rights to litigants had not been accorded uniform approval by the lower courts, thus
making a discovery standard for FOIA disclosure "unworkable." 98 S. Ct. at 2328-29 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see pt. II infra.
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been required to make a specific factual showing that disclosure of witness
statements would obstruct pending enforcement proceedings. 63
The two justices admitted that nondisclosure of unfavorable statements by
current employees is justified, since disclosure is likely to foster intimidation by
employers or unions. 64 They would permit, however, disclosure of favorable
witness statements, and statements of former employees and union representa-
tives when there is no basis to presume that such witnesses are susceptible to
retaliation for testifying to the Board. 6S In those instances, the Board should be
required to show a reasonable possibility of interference with enforcement
proceedings by employer or union reprisal. 66 In sum, the dissent found that the
majority's conclusive presumption of witness intimidation "threatens to un-
dermine the [FOIA's] overall presumption of disclosure" by failing to balance
adequately the right to information in the government's possession with the
likelihood that disclosure will result in specific harm to the agency.
6 7
C. Criticisms of the Robbins Opinion
The Court's establishment of a conclusive presumption that disclosure of
witness statements in any unfair labor practice case will result in witness
intimidation is inconsistent with the objective of the FOIA to provide the fullest
possible disclosure of government information. 6 8 Moreover, the decision por-
tends inequitable consequences for litigants seeking information relevant to
their cases prior to Board hearings.
The Court's rejection of a case-by-case approach to determine whether
disclosure of investigatory records would interfere with Board proceedings
seems to contradict the purposes of certain provisions of the FOIA. In amend-
ing the statute in 1974, Congress allowed courts to use in camera examination of
requested documents to review the propriety of an agency's claims of exemp-
tion.69 Congress also directed agencies to release factual material in requested
documents that is "reasonably segregable" from exempt material.7 0 These
provisions were intended to complement the language of the exemptions in
order to guard against automatic withholding of investigatory records. 7' In
63. Id. at 2329-30 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id. at 2331-32 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Climax
Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 63, 65 (10th Cir. 1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB,
538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976)).
,65. Id. at 2332 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 2332 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); H.R_ Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5-6 (1966); 120 Cong. Rec. 17016-18 (1974).
69. Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1. 88 Stat. 1561
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976)).
70. Id. § 2 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976)).
71. Senator Kennedy, a leading sponsor of the 1974 amendments, articulated the congressional
objective: "With the new provisions it should be clear that there can be no blanket claim of
confidentiality under any of the exemptions. In connection with this objective, S. 2543 proposes
specifically to reaffirm the discretion of the courts through in camera inspection to examine each
and every element of requested files or records .... That procedure is consistent with our intent
that only parts of records which are specifically exempt may be withheld from public disclosure.
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fact, to insure that the Board had met its burden of proving that disclosure
would interfere with its proceedings, 72 many courts prior to Robbins conducted
in camera examinations of the requested witness statements. 73 If the requested
documents included statements of current employees, many courts refused to
divulge them. 7
4
After Robbins, however, courts must conclusively presume that disclosure of
witness affidavits will interfere with Board enforcement proceedings. Thus, in
considering the propriety of a Board refusal to produce requested documents,
the only remaining issue is whether an enforcement proceeding is imminent or
in progress. 7 5 Since there is no need for in camera inspection to determine that a
case is pending, 76 this important function of the courts to insure the existence of
an adequate factual basis for an exemption has been eliminated. By rejecting
the argument that the amended language of exemption 7(A) and the provisions
for in camera review and segregability demand closer scrutiny of an agency's
reasons for withholding information, the Court has reestablished a wooden
interpretation of the investigatory records exemption. 77
This should result in maximum possible disclosure and is consistent with the original purpose in
enacting the [FOIA]." 120 Cong. Rec. 17019 (1974); see H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
5-6 (1972), reprinted in 1975 Source Book, supra note 53, at 10-11.
72. The legislative history clearly indicates that the agency must demonstrate the applicability
of an exemption: "The proceedings are to be de novo so that the court can consider the propriety of
the withholding instead of being restricted to judicial sanctioning of agency discretion. The Court
will have authority whenever it considers such action equitable and appropriate to enjoin the
agency from withholding its records and to order the production of agency records improperly
withheld. The burden of proof is placed upon the agency which is the only party able to justify the
withholding. A private citizen cannot be asked to prove that an agency has withheld information
improperly because he will not know the reasons for the agency action." H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 Source Book, supra note 24, at 30; see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 93 (1973).
73. See, e.g., Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1136 (4th Cir. 1977); Harvey's
Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1976); Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB,
534 F.2d 484, 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612,
624 n.30 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976)
74. See Abrahamson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. NLRB, 561 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1977); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548
F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1977); New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (1st Cir.
1976); Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 11.39 (9th Cir. 1976); Climax Molybdenum
Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80(3d
Cir. 1976); Goodfriend W. Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 'Ist Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 895 (1976); Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
834 (1976). In a clever use of the segregability device, one district court ordered the Board to
release certain witness affidavits with the names and other identifying characteristics of the
witnesses deleted. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F. Supp. 629, 631 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
75. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 98 S. Ct. at 2326-27.
76. See Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Perry, 571 F.2d 195, 202 (4th Cir. 1978);
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
77. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text. Commentators have criticized this rigid
construction of FOIA requirements. "The 1974 amendments specifically rejected a no-balancing,
absolute interpretation which would have excluded further judicial inquiry after a file's charac-
teristics as a generic 'law enforcement file' were established." J. O'Reilly, supra note 22, at 17-34;
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More importantly, the Court's failure to require examination of the factual
circumstances in each case will lead to inequitable consequences for several
classes of litigants.7 8 Admittedly, nondisclosure is justified when substantial
danger of intimidation of employee witnesses exists. For example, in Local 30,
United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers v. NLRB, 7 9 the court upheld the
Board's refusal to disclose all affidavits in its file to a union that had been
charged with unfair labor practices. In Local 30, the Board alleged that the
union had assaulted and threatened various persons, and prevented them from
entering worksites.80 The union sought the affidavits of several employees. The
court found that the Board had carried its burden of establishing interference
with enforcement proceedings; it was "fair to infer" from the factual back-
ground that release of affidavits prior to the hearing would create a substantial
danger that the witnesses would be intimidated. 81
When no evidence of violence or demonstrable opportunity for witness
intimidation exists, however, the argument that disclosure of witness state-
ments would necessarily interfere with enforcement proceedings is difficult to
justify. For example, in Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 8 the court ordered the
Board to release to a requesting employer statements and affidavits collected by
the Board that were favorable to the employer in his defense to unfair labor
practice charges.8 3 The court, acknowledging the statutory purpose of provid-
ing "the fullest responsible disclosure, '8 4 stated that it could not "envision any
reprisal by a company against affiants who have made statements favorable to
its position at the NLRB hearing. ' s85 Furthermore, the court felt it would be
particularly unfair to withhold favorable affidavits when sought under the
FOIA. Because a Board prosecutor presumably will not call a witness whose
see Note, Backdooring the NLRB: Use and Abuse of the Amended FOIA for Administrative
Discovery, 8 Loy. Chi. L.J. 145, 167 (1976); 51 St. John's L. Rev. 251, 268 (1977).
78. Employers have also attempted to use the FOIA to obtain union authorization cards
submitted to the Board during representation and unfair labor practice cases. The Board has
denied disclosure of these cards on the basis of exemption 6, which states that disclosure is not
required of "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). In Committee on
Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977), the Third Circuit approved the Board's
position and held that authorization cards could not be disclosed prior to an election because
employees' exercise of the right to vote might be "chilled" if they knew an employer could see who
signed the cards supporting the union. Id. at 221; see Madeira Nursing Center v. NLRB, 96
L.R.R.M. 2411 (S.D. Ohio 1976); NLRB v. Biophysics Sys., Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); NLRB Memorandum 77-109, reprinted in [1978] 4 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) c 9142. Since the
Supreme Court's rationale in Robbins also emphasized the possibilities for intimidation and
coercion inherent in the employer-employee relationship, Robbins may be relied upon as support
for barring disclosure of authorization cards in order to avoid interference with the Board's
carefully conducted representation proceedings.
79. 408 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
80. Id. at 526.
81. Id.
82. 410 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
83. Id. at 186.
84. Id.; see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
85. 410 F. Supp. at 186. The court conducted an in camera review to make this determination.
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prehearing testimony is favorable to the company, production of such affidavits
at the hearing would be unlikely under the Board's rule permitting disclosure
only after an affiant has testified.8 6
The Court in Robbins dismissed cases such as Temple-Eastex on the theory
that, although the "risk of intimidation... may be somewhat diminished with
regard to statements that are favorable to the employer, those known to have
already given favorable statements are then subject to pressure to give even
more favorable testimony."8 7 Neither the Court nor the Board offered any
factual support for this assumption. Yet given the Court's conclusive presump-
tion that interference with enforcement proceedings will always follow disclo-
sure of witness statements, no evidence is necessary to justify the Board's claim
of witness intimidation. It is submitted, however, that the FOIA presumption
of disclosure is not overcome if the Board cannot prove that interference is
likely to result from diclosure of favorable witness statements. In these cir-
cumstances, therefore, requests for information should be granted.
The Court's holding in Robbins is similarly unsupportable when applied to
statements made by former employees or nonemployees 8 8 As discussed above,
current employees may be subject to economic and physical coercion by an
unscrupulous employer or union if they elect to testify at a Board hearing. 89
However, when a case comes before the Board after an employee witness has
left the charged employer, or if the witness is an outside union agent or official,
it is less probable that disclosure of their affidavits would necessarily lead to
employer or union retaliation. 90 Prior to Robbins, the Fourth Circuit balanced
these considerations in Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. Perry.91
The court held it within the discretion of the district court to require the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to release the affidavits of former em-
ployees whose willingness to testify in hearings would not be "chilled" by the
fear of employer reprisals. 92 This decision demonstrates that the FOIA pro-
86. Id.; see note 20 supra and accompanying text.
87. 98 S. Ct. at 2326.
88. See id. at 2332 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); notes 64-67 supra and
accompanying text.
89. See NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1977); Roger J. Au &
Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2"d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976); notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
90. See United Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 449 F. Supp. 407, 409-10 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
Although the possibility of physical or mental coercion exists even against nonemployces, see, e.g.,
New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 382-83 (1st Cir. 1976); Decker
Foundry Co., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 17, 1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB
Dec.) 19,649, it is presumably less than if that person were subject to the constant supervision of
the employer in the confines of the work environment. See Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575
F.2d 301, 310 (1st Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. July 11, 1978) (No.
78-67).
91. 571 F.2d 195, 202 (4th Cir. 1978). The court determined that although affidavits procured
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from present employees should not be released
to an employer charged with racial discrimination and retaliatory discharge, affidavits procured
from former employees should be disclosed, since the agency had not demonstrated possible
interference with the pending litigation. Id. at 202-03.
92. Id. at 202. Decisions involving the NLRB, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, and the Fair Labor Standards Authority have considered the peculiar character of the
employer-employee relationship in making discovery determinations. See id.; Brennan v. En-
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vides the courts with a realistic and equitable method to balance the right of
access to information with the possibility of harm to the agency's proceedings
that might result from disclosure. 93
In sum, the breadth of the holding in Robbins, in contrast to the more studied
considerations of "interference" in Local 30, Temple-Eastex, and Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, is difficult to reconcile with Congress' intention in enacting the
FOIA and exemption 7(A). Moreover, the Supreme Court's expectation that
witness intimidation Will necessarily result from prehearing disclosure beyond
that permitted by the Board's discovery rules reflects an uncritical acceptance
of dated Board assumptions. 94 The Court determined that protection of the
Board's potential witnesses is so crucial that it justifies depriving all private
litigants of necessary information. Critics have recently suggested, however,
that the behavioral assumption that employers will respond coercively to
employees who cooperate with the Board is often unverified. 95 Indeed, with the
growth of the institutional power of many unions, employees are afforded more
protection from retaliation by an employer than in the incipient years of labor
unionism. 96 Furthermore, to deter both employer and union intimidation, the
NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against
an employee who has testified before the Board, 97 or for a union to coerce
gineered Prods., Inc., 506 F.2d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1974); Wirtz v. Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc.,
327 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1964); Wirtz v. B.A.C. Steel Prods., Inc., 312 F.2d 14, 16 (4th Cir.
1962). Supreme Court labor law rulings have also "take[n] into account the economic dependence of
the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that
relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by
a more disinterested ear." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
93. See Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2804, 2810 (WV.D. OkL-.), rev'd, 93
L.R.R.M. 2799 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Barnes & Noble Bookstores v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M.
2169, 2170 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2072, 2075 (C.D.
Cal. 1976).
94. See Prehearing Discovery, supra note 1, at 340-41. "t is not enough for the NLRB to
express its own moral judgment or even community sentiment. To say 'there ought to be a law
against it' does not demonstrate the propriety of the NLRB's imposing the prohibition." Cox, The
Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1437 (1958).
95. Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: A Proposal, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 1441, 1442 (1977). A recently commissioned Board task force was unable to devise
prerequisites for disclosure of preheaing statements. The task force attributed its inaction to a
division in the committee characterized by "strongly held and widely disparate opinions on the
reality of employee fear as an inhibiting factor in securing statements from witnesses." Chairman's
Task Force on the NLRB, Interim Report and Recommendations, [19761 Lab. Rel. Y.B. 327, 352
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Task Force]; see note 127 infra. See also J. Getman, S. Goldberg, & J.
Herman, Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality (1976); Getman & Goldberg, The Myth
of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1972).
96. See generally D. Brody, The American Labor Movement (1971); S.M. Upset, M. Trow, J.
Coleman, Union Democracy (1956); Bornstein, Unions, Critics, and Collective Bargaining, 27
Lab. L.J. 614, 622 (1976); Marchione, A Case for Individual Rights Under Collective Agreements,
27 Lab. L.J. 738, 739 (1976).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976); see, e.g., Jack Holland & Son, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 39
(Aug. 4, 1978), [197815 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,607; Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B.
No. 190 (Mar. 6, 1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,105; General Servs., Inc.,
229 N.L.R.B. 940 (1977); John Dory Boat Works, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 844 (1977); Rockford
Newspapers, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 429 (1977).
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employees in the exercise of their protected rights. 98 The Robbins Court re-
jected these remedial measures in favor of the more "prophylactic" nondisclo-
sure rule.9 9 It is submitted, however, that consideration of the factual circum-
stances in each case would provide the safeguards that the Robbins Court
stressed, by denying disclosure only when a reasonable possibility of witness
intimidation exists.
Admittedly, the Court's concern that advance access to Board materials will
permit charged parties to construct defenses and allow violations of the NLRA
to go unremedied,100 is not without merit. In addition, the Court's observation
that Board responses to FOIA requests would consume an excessive amount of
agency time cannot be ignored. 101 This analysis, however, not only precludes
the availability of information that would aid an innocent employer in respond-
ing to charges, but also disregards the possibility that discovery will hasten the
resolution of disputes. 102 Thus, the Court's decision to deny FOIA disclosure in
Board proceedings should be limited in order to account for the variety of
circumstances in unfair labor practice cases.
II. IMPACT OF Robbins ON BOARD DISCOVERY
The Supreme Court's inadequate consideration of the factual variables in
Robbins may plausibly be extended to close alternative avenues to information
in the Board's possession. Although Robbins' conclusive presumption against
disclosure is limited to witness statements, the opinion lends support to the
Board's policy that its proceedings require insulation from possible employer
and union interference. 10 3 Robbins' rationale may therefore influence the cur-
rent controversy among the circuits concerning the validity of Board decisions
denying requests for traditional prehearing discovery. 10 4
98. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1976); see, e.g., Welsbach Elec. Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 63 (May
26, 1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,419; Local 90, Operative Plasterers, 236
N.L.R.B. No. 37 (May 25, 1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) V 19,297; Interna-
tional Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, 228 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1977);
District 1199, Nat'l Union of Hosp. Health Care Employees, 227 N.L.R.B. 1732 (1977).
99. 98 S. Ct. at 2325.
100. Id. at 2326.
101. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. See generally Irving, The Right to Privacy &
Freedom of Information: The NLRB and Issues Under the Privacy Act and the Freedom of
Information Act, in Proceedings of the New York University Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on
Labor 49, 54-55 (R. Adelman ed. 1976).
102. One labor lawyer has noted that "anyone who regularly practices in Federal or state courts
of general jurisdiction... appreciates the fact that discovery is, in reality, a timesaving procedure.
Full discovery has the effect of clarifying the issues and expediting the trial. More importantly,
however, full discovery is probably one of the greatest catalysts to settlement." Prehearing Discov-
ery, supra note 1, at 340. See also Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why Agencies
Should Catch Up with the Courts, 46 A.B.A. J. 74 (1960); Gallagher, Use of Pre-Trial as a Means of
Overcoming Undue and Unnecessary Delay in Administrative Proceedings, 12 Ad. L. Bull. 44
(1959-1960); note 127 infra.
103. See 98 S. Ct. at 2324-27.




The Second and Fifth Circuits represent opposite poles in the judicial conflict
over the Board's authority to deny litigants the use of discovery techniques. los
The Fifth Circuit has held that the Board must permit discovery in unfair labor
practice proceedings when the requesting party demonstrates "good cause."' 0 6
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, asserts that the permissibility of
discovery is relegated solely to the Board's discretion. 0 7
The Fifth Circuit, which held in favor of FOIA disclosure in Robb ins, argues
that the Board "should freely permit discovery procedure in order that the
rights of all parties may be properly protected."' 08 It asserts that section 10(b)
of the NLRA, which requires that unfair labor practice proceedings be con-
ducted in accordance with the rules of evidence, 109 gives the Board authority to
permit discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 110 The
105. See Note, Discovery in Proceedings Before the NLRB: NLRB v. Interboro Contractors,
Inc., 36 Mo. L. Rev. 537, 539 (1971) [hereinafter cited as DiscoveryJ.
106. NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Div. of DHJ Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1974);
NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Safway Steel
Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968).
107. NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 481 (2d Cir. 1976); NLRB v Lizdale
Knitting Mills, Inc., 523 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432
F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971). The Second Circuit's view has
been adopted by the Sixth Circuit, NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530 F.2d 693, 694-95 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976), and by the First Circuit, P.S.C. Resources, Inc. v. NLRB, 576
F.2d 380, 386 (1st Cir. 1978); D'Youville Manor, Lowell, Mass., Inc. v. NLRB, 526 F.2d 3, 7
(1st Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Diamond Standard Fuel Corp., 437 F.2d 1163, 1164 (1st Cir. 1971); see
Annot., 4 A.L.R. Fed. 493 (1970).
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits' positions fall between those of the Second and Fifth Circuits.
These circuits agree with the Second Circuit that the Board is not required by 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1976), to adopt the entire discovery procedure contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir. 1961) (requests for
investigatory files); NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951) (requests for
depositions). Like the Fifth Circuit, however, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits admit that in certain
circumstances the application of the Board's rules might constitute an abuse of discretion if a party
made a sufficient showing of need for prehearing discovery. Electromec Design & Dev. Co., Inc. v.
NLRB, 409 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d at 407. These
circuits are nevertheless reluctant to find an abuse of discretion when the appealing party has
received a full hearing, and obtains witness statements for cross-examination purposes. See
Electromec Design & Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d at 635; NLRB v. National Survey Serv., Inc.,
361 F.2d 199, 206 (7th Cir. 1966). See also NLRB v. Automotive Textile Prods. Co., 422 F.2d
1255, 1256 (6th Cir. 1970).
108. NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting
NLRB v. Southern Materials Co., 345 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1965)); accord, Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 2311
(1978); NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Div. of DHJ Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1974).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
110. NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Div. of DHJ Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1974);
NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Safway Steel
Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968); accord,
McClain Indus. v. NLRB, 381 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd on other grounds, 521 F.2d 596
(6th Cir. 1974). The McClain court argued that "the rules of civil procedure often modify and
sometimes alter the rules of evidence. The discovery provisions contained in the rules of civil
procedure have such an effect. We think Congress intended to include the rules of civil
procedure, as far as practicable, in proceedings before the Board." Id. at 189.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Fifth Circuit contends that the Board's rule permitting depositions for "good
cause"'11 grants discretionary authority to allow depositions for the purpose of
discovery when such a procedure would be "practicable in the circumstances of
the case and if it is not used to harass or coerce employees . "... ,112 That
authority imposes an affirmative duty upon the Board to provide for discovery
where the denial thereof would result in actual prejudice to the moving par-
ty.113
Despite this liberal policy, the Fifth Circuit has yet to find that Board denials
of requests for discovery were more than technical errors not requiring rever-
sal. 114 However, it held in NLRB v. Schill Steel Products, Inc. IIs that state-
ments of Board witnesses are discoverable prior to hearings in civil contempt
proceedings brought to challenge noncompliance with appellate court de-
crees. In Schill, the court discounted the Board's objection that witnesses
will be intimidated if discovery is permitted before trial, since the identities of
the witnesses are revealed in any event when they testify. 116 The Schill ratio-
nale may conceivably be extended to compel discovery in unfair labor practice
proceedings as well.
The Second Circuit has repeatedly refused to accept the Fifth Circuit's view
that the Board should allow discovery if "good cause" is shown. 117 It has
accorded Board denials of discovery a "heavy presumption of validity," 1 8 for
several reasons. First, it argues that prehearing discovery is neither constitu-
tionally nor statutorily required, leaving the adoption of discovery procedures
to the Board's discretion.' 19 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit does
not interpret the NLRA's requirement that hearings be conducted in accor-
dance with the rules of evidence to impose upon the Board "any particular
pre-trial procedures-such as discovery-which do not by any standard consti-
tute rules of evidence.' 2 0 It also reasons that the Board's rule permitting the
taking of depositions "for good cause shown" is only for the purpose of
obtaining evidence from witnesses who will be unavailable at the hearing. ' 2 '
Furthermore, the Second Circuit supports the Board's policy of insulating its
111. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1977); discussed at note 11 supra and accompanying text.
112. NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1968).
113. NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Div. of DHJ Indus., Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1974);
Morgan Precision Parts v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v, Safway Steel
Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968); see Discovery,
supra note 105, at 540.
114. See NLRB v. W.R. Bean & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 849 (1972); Morgan Precision Parts v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1971).
115. 408 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit's willingness to permit discovery In
Schill may in part be explained by the seriousness of a civil contempt citation and the courts'
consequent reluctance to find a respondent in contempt. See Bartosic & Lanoff, Escalating the
Struggle Against Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 276-81 (1972).
116. 408 F.2d at 807.
117. NLRB v. Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc., 523 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v.
Interporo Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
118. Discovery, supra note 105, at 541.
119. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 915 (1971).
120. Id. at 859.
121. Id. at 857-59.
[Vol. 47
NLRB DISCOVERY
proceedings from discovery in order to avoid "such intimidation and harass-
ment as would otherwise be possible because of the leverage inherent in the
employer-employee relationship. 1 22 It argues that the Board's rule permitting
cross-examination adequately protects private litigants' interests in acquiring
information relevant to their cases.' 23
It is difficult to ascribe to either circuit the more meritorious view, since both
appear guilty of some degree of statutory misinterpretation. The Fifth Circuit
seems to err in asserting that section 10(b) of the NLRA warrants application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the Board's rule permitting
depositions for "good cause" encompasses litigants' discovery as well as
evidentiary needs.' 24 Congress' failure to mention the rules of procedure in
discussing the enactment of section 10(b) supports the Second Circuit's contrary
view that the provision is simply a rule of evidence.' 2 s The Board's consistent
refusal to grant depositions or interrogatories except when witnesses will be
unavailable to testify thus seems at least technically justified. 26
Despite these inaccuracies, however, the Fifth Circuit's approach is prefera-
ble to the Second Circuit's persistent support of the Board's refusal to adopt any
form of discovery. The Fifth Circuit correctly recognizes that the NLRA and
the Board's rules do not prohibit the Board from allowing discovery; thus, the
Board should permit discovery when the requesting party has demonstrated
sufficient need.' 27 The Second Circuit's reliance on cross-examination as a
122. NLRB v. Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc., 523 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1975).
123. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 915 (1971); see note 11 supra and accompanying text.
124. See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971); Discovery, supra note 105, at 541.
125. See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir. 1970), celt. denied,
402 U.S. 915 (1971); 93 Cong. Rec. 7002 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 11 NLRB,
Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 1625 (1948). Representative
Owens stated that § 10(b) "changes the procedure as to the introduction of evidence before the
Board. It must now be conducted according to the 'rules of evidence applicable in the district
courts.. . .'" 93 Cong. Rec. 3529 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, Legislatve History of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, at 697 (1948).
126. See, e.g., Medicine Bow Coal Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 931, 932 (1975); Ronald Hackenberger,
217 N.L.R.B. 736, enforced, 531 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). See also
NLRB Casehandling Manual §§ 10292.4, 10352 (1975), reprinted in NLRB Casehandling Manual
(CCH) 2924, 3520 (1976).
127. A recent task force on Board procedures found that "[d]iscovery is undoubtedly one of the
most significant, controversial issues" requiring the Board's attention. Task Force, supr note 95,
at 348. The task force observed that discovery would tend to quicken unfair labor practice
proceedings by clarifying issues, eliminating peripheral concerns, and improving settlement prac-
tices. The task force also considered the arguments against discovery, which included fear of
reprisals against employee witnesses, time-consumption, expensive adinistration, and the asser-
tion that discovery is unnecessary because of the availability of bills of particulars. After weighing
the opposing views, the task force agreed that "the most helpful tools in preparing for the types of
issues which arise in NLRB cases would be a list of potential witnesses and an indication of their
testimony." Id. at 350. However, because its members were unable to reach a consensus on the
validity of witness intimidation as a reason to deny discovery, it did not suggest that the Board
should begin to reveal the names and statements of potential witnesses. Its recommendations were
limited to the following- complaints should be more specific; the names of outside experts should be
disclosed prior to the hearing; documentary evidence should be exchanged prior to a pretrial
19781
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device to insure fairness to the charged party 128 confuses effective rebuttal of
evidence introduced at the hearing with adequate preparation of defenses to the
underlying charges. Since the Fifth Circuit has not yet found that deprivation
of the needs of litigants to prepare for hearings has constituted an abuse of
discretion sufficient to compel discovery, the distinction between the circuits
may appear somewhat academic. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit's unwilling-
ness to accept Board rulings denying discovery, which do not consider the
competing interests at stake, represents the more favorable judicial attitude.
In recognition of the fairness underlying the Fifth Circuit's balancing ap-
proach, commentators have suggested the adoption of liberalized discovery
procedures by the Board.1 29 They stress the benefits of discovery,130 and argue
that its abuses can be prevented by use of evidentiary and executive privi-
leges, 131 and by rigorous enforcement of section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA, which
protects persons who have testified before the Board. 132 Although the Supreme
Court in Robbins did not find section 8(a)(4) effective enough to prevent
potential interference with the Board's enforcement proceedings in the context
of the FOIA,133 it did allude to the possible unfairness inherent in the Board's
general discovery rules. Thus, Robbins' restrictive rationale should not be
conference, but without identification of employees; issues and positions of the parties should be
clarified at a pretrial conference on the day of the hearing; all information compiled by the General
Counsel in backpay proceedings should be disclosed; and a settlement conference should be held
within the hour immediately preceding the hearing. Id. at 352.
Recent comments by the Board's General Counsel suggest that adoption of these proposals is
unlikely. The General Counsel listed four "essential prerequisites" to establishment of prehearing
discovery in Board proceedings. First, disclosure must expedite rather than delay the Board's
processes; second, disclosure must result in the settlement of more cases prior to litigation; third,
methods must be devised to protect witnesses from intimidation and to insure the steady flow of
information to Board investigators; fourth, pretrial discovery must provide the Board with "recip-
rocal access to information."NLRB General Counsel on Pre-TrialDiscovery, [1976 Lab. Rel. Y.B.
165 (1977).
128. See notes 20, 124 sufpra and accompanying text.
129. See Davis, Revising the Administrative Procedure Act, 29 Ad. L. Rev. 35 (1977). In a
letter to the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Professor Davis
stated: "A rather clear inadequacy of the APA is its failure to provide for discovery. All lawyers
know that the discovery practice in federal district courts has been entirely successful, but the APA
contains no counterpart of Rule 34 of the Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at 44; accord, Garvey,
supra note 8, at 717-20; Manoli & Joseph, supra note 8, at 10-16; Tomlinson, Discovery in
Agency Adjudication, 1971 Duke L.J. 89.
130. See note 103 supra and accompanying text. Justice Traynor has also noted that "[tlhe
Legislature's silence with respect to prehearing discovery m. administrative proceedings does not
mean ... that it has rejected such discovery .... We are committed to the wisdom of discovery, by
statute in civil cases . . . , and by common law in criminal cases." Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d
475, 479, 421 P.2d 65, 67-68, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219-20 (1966) (citation omitted).
131. For a discussion of the privileges asserted by the Board, see J. H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); NLRB v. Capitol Fish
Co., 294 F.2d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 1961); Manoli & Joseph, supra note 8, at 17.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976). One commentator suggested the use of a "rebuttable pre-
sumption" that any detrimental change in the terms, conditions, or status of employment of a
named employee-witness subsequent to discovery was in retaliation for participation in the Board
proceeding. Unless the employer came forward with a business justification for his action, the
Board would find a violation of § 8(a)(4). Garvey, supra note 8, at 719.
133. 98 S. Ct. at 2325-26; see note 100 supra and accompanying text.
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used to deny other forms of discovery to Board litigants. Instead, the courts
should adopt the Fifth Circuit's balancing approach to permit discovery when
it would be practical and equitable.
III AQUIRING INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM
POTENTIAL BOARD WITNESSES
In response to the Board's discovery rules restricting access to information in
the Board's possession, litigants have sought the voluntary cooperation of
potential witnesses to acquire relevant information. Examination of the flexible
rules adopted by the courts in this area reveals that a balancing of interests
approach is in fact a workable and acceptable way of resolving discovery
issues, and further demonstrates the inadvisability of extending the Robbins
rationale to close other routes to disclosure.
Employers customarily use two methods to elicit information directly from
employees: interviewing employees, 13 4 and requesting them to release copies of
their prehearing statements made to the Board. 135 In considering the propriety
of these alternative discovery devices, the courts examine the factual context in
which such activity arises to determine whether the possible infringement of
employee rights is outweighed by the needs of employers to respond to unfair
labor practice complaints. 136 Both the Board and the courts recognize the
right of an employer to interview employees for the purpose of investigating
allegations of an unfair labor practice complaint when the questioning is
necessary to prepare the employer's defense. 137 In Johnnie's Poultry Co., 138 the
Board established specific safeguards to minimize the possible coercive impact
of such interviews. These standards require the employer or his counsel to
communicate to the employee the purpose of the questioning, to assure him
that no reprisal will take place, to obtain his participation on a voluntary
basis, and to conduct questioning in a context free from employer hostility to
union organization. 139 The questioning itself must not be coercive in nature;
questions must not exceed the necessities of case preparation by prying into
other union matters or eliciting information concerning an employee's subjec-
tive state of mind, nor may they otherwise interfere with the statutory rights
of employees.'
40
134. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Aug. 15, 1978). 119781 5
Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 9' 19,647; Osco Drug, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (Aug. 1,
1978), [197815 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) T 19,599. See generally lntert'iewing Employees
for Trial: Be Careful What You Ask, How You Do It, [1978] 4 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) c 9098;
Annot., 4 A.L.R. Fed. 280 (1970).
135. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1964); Anserphone,
Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (June 15, 1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) C 19,441;
John Dory Boat Works, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 844, 848 (1977).
136. See NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320 (2d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Tamper, Inc.,
522 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1975); Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1975).
137. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245(5th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. P.B. &
S. Chem. Co., 567 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2d
Cir. 1971); Firestone Steel Prods. Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 1040(1977); Rupp Indus., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B.
385 (1975).
138. 146 N.L.R.B. 770 (1964), re-o'd on other grounds, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965).
139. Id. at 775.
140. Id. These requirements also apply to employer questioning of employees in preparation of
1978]
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Although no "magic words" need be used to comport with these stan-
dards,1 4 1 questioning exceeds the permissible range if an employer or his
attorney asks an employee to drop his case, 142 fails to tell employees that they
are free not to answer questions, 143 or asks employees what they think will
happen "if the union doesn't get in."144 Failure to achieve reasonable com-
pliance with the Johnnie's Poultry standards subjects the employer to the
penalties of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 145 which makes it an unfair labor
practice to interfere with employees' protected rights. 146 Thus, although the
Board gives an employer some latitude in preparing his defense, questions
must be confined to the perimeters designed by the Board to avoid still
another unfair labor practice charge. 14 7
The courts have applied a totality of circumstances test in reviewing the
propriety of employer questioning. 148 Relevant factors include the history of
employer hostility to employees and unionism, the nature of the information
sought, the identity of the questioner, the place and method of interrogation,
and the truthfulness of replies.149 If the employer has a legitimate interest in
soliciting information under the circumstances, and the questioning does not
have a reasonable tendency to intimidate interviewees, the courts generally will
not find that an employer has committed an unfair labor practice by conducting
the interviews. 150 In sum, by weighing an employer's needs for information
against an employee's right to make uninhibited use of the NLRA's protections,
the Board and the courts have achieved an adequate accomodation of compet-
ing interests.
The Board, however, has not extended that rationale to the second method
of acquiring information from employees. It has refused to permit employers to
ask employees for copies of statements given to the Board during investigation
objections to an election. Paymaster Oil Mill Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 396 (1970), enforced, 447 F.2d 147
(5th Cir. 1971). See also NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d .346 (2d Cir. 1965) (interrogations during
union organization campaigns).
141. Lammert Indus., 229 N.L.R.B. 895 (1977), enforced, [1978] 4 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (84
Lab. Cas.) 10,674 (7th Cir. June 29, 1978).
142. Firestone Steel Prods. Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1043 (1977).
143. Richard T. Furtney; 212 N.L.R.B. 462, 466 (1974), enforced, 96 L.R.R.M. 2107 (6th Cir.
1975).
144. Rupp Indus., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 385, 390 (1975).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
146. See United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 689, 694 (1976), enforced, 554 F.2d
1276 (4th Cir. 1977).
147. An employer who decides to question his employees has made a perilous choice. The risk
of incurring an unfair labor practice violation while attempting to defend another one suggests the
inadequacy of this method as an alternative to discovery procedures. See NLRB v. Hardeman
Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559, 563 n.9 (6th Cir. 1977).
148. See, e.g., Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. P.B. &
S. Chem. Co., 567 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2d
Cir. 1971).
149. Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 492 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1975); Bourne v.
NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964).
150. See NLRB v. P.B. & S. Chem. Co., 567 F.2d 1263, 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1976). But see NLRB v. Tamper, Inc., 522 F.2d
781, 781 (4th Cir. 1975).
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of an unfair labor practice charge. 151 The Board contends that a prehearing
statement of an employee may contain information not relevant to the charge
brought against the employer.Is 2 Furthermore, if these statements can be made
available to an employer simply at his request, the Board's ability to investigate
unfair labor practices would be seriously hampered because of the inhibitory
effect on employees' willingness to talk.153
The unfairness of the Board's per se rule is demonstrated by its decision
in Bayliner Marine Corp. '5 4 The employer had discharged certain employ-
ees, allegedly because of dereliction in their work duties. The discharges,
however, occurred several days after the employees had attended a union
meeting. The Board charged that the employer discriminated against employ-
ees for their involvement in union activities. In his defense, the employer
contended that he had no knowledge of union activity beyond the rumors that
had been circulating in the plant for many years.15 5 The Board found that the
employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA when the employer's attorney
attempted to secure the statements of employees who had told Board agents
that all of the discussions concerning union activity were "secret," and that no
members of management could have any knowledge of union activity. 15 6
In his dissent, Member Kennedy criticized the Board's per se rule.'5 7 He
noted the unfairness of the Board in ignoring the needs of employers to prepare
their defenses thoroughly and stated: "If this Board is determined to deprive
counsel [of] a reasonable opportunity to prepare their defense to unfair labor
practice complaints ... then we must be prepared to accept discovery proce-
dures .... Board proceedings are not so unique that respondent's counsel must
be prepared to defend their cases in the dark."' 58
The courts also criticize the Board's per se rule, and permit employers more
flexibility in using this method to secure information relevant to their de-
fense. 15 9 Again adopting a case-by-case approach to balance the competing
interests, the courts uniformly hold that the mere request for a prehearing
statement does not constitute an unfair labor practice. 60 This approach does
151. W.T. Grant Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1963), enforcenzent granted in part and denied in
part, 337 F.2d 447, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1964); see Anserphone Inc., 236 N.L.R-B. No. 112 (June 15,
1978), [1978] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) (NLRB Dec.) 19,441; John Dory Boat Works, Inc., 229
N.L.R.B. 844, 848 (1977). The Board rules permit any witness to obtain copies of his statement.
NLRB Casehandling Manual § 10058.2 (1975), reprinted in NLRB Casehandling Manual (CCU)
582 (1976).
152. See NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 480 (2d Cir. 1976); Robertshaw
Controls Co., Lux Time Div. v. NLRB, 483 F.2d 762, 769 (4th Cir. 1973).
153. See Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R-B. 770, 775 (1964), re'd on other grounds, 344
F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965).
154. 215 N.L.R.B. 12 (1974).
155. Id. at 12.
156. Id. at 13.
157. Id. at 13-14 (Member Kennedy, dissenting).
158. Id. at 14 (Member Kennedy, dissenting).
159. See NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 479 (2d Cir. 1976); Suprenant Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1965); W.T. Grant Co. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 447,
448-49 (7th Cir. 1964).
160. See, e.g., NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 479 (2d Cir. 1976); Suprenant
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not hamper the Board's efforts in policing overly aggressive employers, yet
sanctions reasonable attempts to acquire pertinent information.
The courts have found that employer's conduct has interfered with employee
rights when an employer's requests caused the employees to become apprehen-
sive, 1 61 when the employer's attorney told an employee that delivery would put
a "feather in his cap,"'1 62 and when the employer sought to elicit all information
given to Board agents.' 63 However, when there is no evidence to suggest that
the employer's requests had an inhibitory effect upon an employee's exercise of
his right to an effective investigation by the Board, the courts have overturned
Board decisions prohibiting the request. 16 For example, when employees were
asked "if they would mind" supplying copies of their statements and the
employees willingly complied with the request, it was held that the employer
did not coerce its employees and was entitled to such information to prepare its
defense.165 In another case, a company attorney sought to obtain employee
witness statements favorable to the employer, and explained to employees that
they would neither be punished for refusal nor rewarded for compliance with
the request.166 Although the Board held that this conduct violated the NLRA,
the court found that the employees had voluntarily complied and were "willing
and anxious to aid" their employer.' 67 These cases demonstrate that when
an employee is given clear assurances that no retaliation will follow, and the
employer is properly engaged in pretrial preparation of a defense, there is little
justification for holding the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice merely
because it attempted to secure a copy of the employee's statement to the
Board. 168
In summary, the courts' policy of allowing employers in certain circum-
stances to secure the cooperation of employees to obtain prehearing information
casts further doubt on the validity of the Board's restrictive approach to
discovery of information in the possession of either the Board or potential
witnesses. As the above discussion has indicated, courts can distinguish be-
tween those situations in which witness intimidation is a probable consequence
of disclosure, and those instances where such claims are unrealistic. The
Board's interest in protecting employees' rights has thus not been sacrificed in
the process. Accordingly, to extend Robbins' conclusive presumption that
coercion inevitably follows disclosure beyond the scope of FOIA proceedings
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1965); W.T. Grant Co. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d
447, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1964).
161. Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1964).
162. NLRB v. Ambox, Inc., 357 F.2d 138, 141 (Sth Cir. 1966).
163. Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 133-34 (5th Cir. 1964).
164. NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466,481 (2d Cir. 1976); Robertshaw Controls
Co., Lux Time Div. v. NLRB, 483 F.2d 762, 767 (4th Cir. 1973).
165. NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466, 481 (2d Cir. 1976).
166. Robertshaw Controls Co., Lux Time Div. v. NLRB, 483 F.2d 762, 766-67 (4th Cir. 1973).
167. Id. at 770.
168. In NLRB v. Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 534 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1976), the court acknowl-
edged its previous holdings that parties to Board proceedings "are not entitled to the full panoply of
discovery procedures provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a matter of statutory or
constitutional right," but found that "[iut is not a violation of § 8(a)(1) to request such limited
discovery and disclosure . . . ." Id. at 481.
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can only exacerbate the inequities which a case-by-case determination is
equipped to remove.
CONCLUSION
The Robbins Court's declaration that disclosure of all witness statements
necessarily interferes with Board proceedings must of course be read in light of
the specific provisions of the FOIA. Its broad presumption, however, that
witness intimidation is the inevitable result of disclosure may arguably be
extended to foreclose access to information that is now available to Board
litigants. On the contrary, especially after Robbins, courts should scrutinize the
Board's restrictive discovery decisions more closely in order to protect the
interests of charged parties in securing relevant information. In addition, courts
should take a more aggressive stance in reviewing Board decisions that strin-
gently limit the right of private litigants to seek the cooperation of employees in
preparing their defenses. The inequities of a per se refusal to grant access to
information are particularly apparent when a charged party has little history of
hostility to unionism, when a strong union diminishes the likelihood of em-
ployer reprisals, and when witnesses are neither employees nor susceptible to
physical or economic coercion. Obviously, the possibility of intimidation should
not be disregarded even in these instances. Yet examination of the peculiar
circumstances surrounding each Board refusal to disclose should protect the
Board's investigatory and prosecutorial processes, without simultaneously de-
priving litigants of opportunities to respond adequately to Board charges. A
more restrictive approach sacrifices fairness in the adjudicatory process.
Ruth D. Raisfeld
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